足立研セミナー: A Dynamic Pivot Mechanism with Application to Real Time Pricing in Power Systems
Dr Takashi Tanaka（MIT LIDS）
- 2012年11月28日（水） 10:45～12:15
- 創想館2階 セミナールーム1 （14-201）
We consider a dynamic game with a single leader who tries to maximize social welfare and multiple followers who try to maximize individual profits. We present a dynamic VCG-like mechanism which induces followers to implement the optimal control desired by the leader. The proposed mechanism achieves feedback incentive compatibility as well as two other desirable properties, namely participation rationality and acquisition feasibility, under certain conditions. The mechanism is intended to be a possible alternative real time power pricing scheme, whose desirable features are illustrated through a comparison with existing schemes.
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